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This article seeks to unpack the idea of the automaton as a figure of political dissent within
technological networks. The idea of the automaton is that of a body where the concepts of
life, agency, and subjectivity are in question; these questions have made the automaton into
an important element in the projects of Enlightenment humanism and as an unspoken ele­
ment in posthumanist examination of the cyborg. The figure of the automaton is an expres­
sion of Cartesian mind­body dualism that reverses the idea of cogito ergo sum, by
questioning the intentionality that lies behind the acts of another body. The body exists, but
does it think? This article is not concerned with the idea of the automaton as an object of
transcendental dualism, but rather aims to investigate this idea in terms of its immanence
within network communication. The automaton is an idea that deliberately complicates the
relationship between machines and individuals within a network, without prioritising
either perspective. As Alan Turing shows, we cannot predict whether a computer on a net­
work (or other machine) is being used by a human agent, or whether the machine is simply
programmed to act autonomously. The issue is then, are the actions of political dissent of a
single node on a computer network the product of an independent agent working in tan­
dem within a democratic framework? Or, is it the reverse: are these acts of political dissid­
ence the automated actions of a small number of individuals exploiting systems of
automation in order to achieve political goals? If we use the automaton to stand in as a fig­
ure that is neither entirely human nor entirely cyborgean, then certain concerns of network
politics and assumptions about the democratic nature of network communications become
destabilised.
When the idea of networked political dissidence is compounded with the automated
functions of software and hardware devices that are necessary to mobilise in networked
political dissent, then explicit human subjects start to disappear. The loss and confusion of
subjects and subject categories within network communications will not be laid to rest here;
instead these instabilities should be kept alive and well, because it is exactly this complica­
tion of the individual that I wish to highlight in the discussion of networked political action.
This idea is useful because it begins to question the relationship of the individual to the
group within the context of political use of network technologies. At the outset, it should be
noted that, in discussing an idea of political automation, this article is not posing the actions
of political dissent as an automatic, reflexive, or unconscious activity, but rather highlight­
ing that from the perspective of technological networks, intentionality in online dissent is
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role of the automaton prefigures the problems of ascribing intent, and acts as a collective
category based on action rather than ideals. To this extent the automaton is a part of a polit­
ical machine of praxis, rather than an agentless drone of ideology.
The figure of the automaton can be meaningfully demonstrated in the context of the
"Distributed Denial of Service attack", or DDoS attack. The methods for DDoS attacks are
variable, depending on the various computational or social mechanisms used, but the meth­
odology for disruption remain true for many different types of communication network.
Everyone is familiar with the sight of an overfull email inbox, the proliferations of meetings
and obligations and phone calls that prevent one's time and space from being productively
useful. The methodology of the DDoS attack operates on the same set of principles irre­
spective of the technological device: flood a target with information beyond its ability to re­
spond to that information. In the case of computer networks, this means utilising multiple
machines to automatically send data packets at a target computer in excess of the network's
ability to sustain communication. The weak point does not need to be the victim computer
itself. The same effect is achieved if it is the network local to the victim computer that shuts
down and becomes unresponsive. The numbers of attacking computers can range into the
thousands, and the network's functionality can quickly be disabled as many thousands of
computers add additional requests to data processing queues. The DDoS attack methodo­
logy thus targets inherent limitations of network structures, by exploiting asymmetries in
the network that are not based on the victim's processing power.
The DDoS attack is not solely a methodology of political dissent, but produces net­
work disturbances that can be utilised for political or economic purposes. As a result, the
DDoS attack is regularly utilised by criminal organisations for financial gain and govern­
ments for the suppression of particular networks. Furthermore, because this attack is based
on structure, rather than specific code exploits or platforms, its nature is low­tech. At times
an inadvertent product of social tendencies in HTTP­based internet browsing. For instance,
if a single link to a minor website is highly promoted on a more popular website, then, with
enough individuals visiting a particular website, the effects of a DDoS attack are replicated
without a political or economic purpose made by the users to cause a disruption.
DDoS attacks are a regular tool in the arsenal of the politically active 'non­group' An­
onymous. Anonymous is a particularly fruitful point for comparison because of the exten­
ded rhetorics that it uses to undermine the attribution of individual intent within its own
collective, and deliberately complicates its own internal social logics so that members are
unknown to each other. 'Anons' refuse to acknowledge any form of internal hierarchy or
leader figures for Anonymous, although there are internal groupings that utilise hierarchal
organisation. The groups coordinate common dissent through calls for action distributed
throughout various web­forums and IRC channels. Gabriella Coleman, an anthropologist of
Anonymous, notes that even within Anonymous the user­base membership in various
DDoS attacks is inconsistent. Coleman believes that this points to internal collectives that
share common sympathies within their operation, but little in the way of overall structure.
As such, Anonymous, and its method of DDoS attack, act as an exemplar for examining the
automation of political dissent ­ as well as for examining the correlate subject of automated
dissent: the automaton. It should be noted, however, that this article is not attempting to of­
fer an anthropological or ethnographic assessment of Anonymous ­ instead, Coleman's re­
search provides great depth along these lines. Within this framework, this article addresses
the problem of over­prescribing intent to DDoS attackers, without resorting to the issue of
ideology. The idea of the automaton bridges the gap between the actions of a social political
network, and a political network practice of dissent.
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utes to system­side perspectives of computer politics. This allows for new understandings
of subject collectivities that emerge from the architectures of networked communication,
and an understanding of methodologies of political activism that arise within these col­
lectivities. When we consider the network on its own terms, then some forms of political be­
haviour are made more open to critical approaches. What becomes at stake when we
consider the role of the automaton as a subject of automated dissent is the question of inten­
tionality and organisation for the use of networks for political purposes. These different un­
derstandings of the role of dissent will also open up the language of Marx's Grundrisse
further in its ability to speak of new media concerns.
In order to develop this idea of the automaton, this article will engage with the idea
of the communication network as a machine operating as an assemblage of tools, individu­
als and knowledges, in a framework provided by Raunig, Marx, Deleuze and Guattari. This
context will form the basis for understanding the historical nature of the automaton as a
subject of technology, before discussing the nature of the automaton in the context of DDoS
attacks, and Anonymous more generally.
MACHINES
Karl Marx provides us with the basis for understanding the automaton's role in net­
work communications, by way of an understanding of the relationship between human be­
ings and technologies. In the section of the Grundrisse commonly referred to as the
"Fragment on Machines" (1973, 690­712), Marx comments on the changing relationship
between an individual labourers and the means of production. Marx describes this change
as a strange reversal of agency in the relationship between machines and people. Initially
labourers utilise tools relatively autonomously, as in the manner that artisan labourers util­
ise individual tools that they control the use of; the change in this case that Marx identifies
is when human beings become implicated in the systems of machinery. In the "automatic
system of machinery" (692) the human worker no longer engages with the machine as a
means of labour, insofar as engagement with the machine is not the means to the produc­
tion of commodities, or a means to an end in itself. Instead the machine system utilises indi­
vidual workers as a means to "matières instrumentales" ­ that is, its needs for care through
maintenance, as well as things such as materials such as coal, oil, and electricity. The object
of labour for the worker is the machine itself. Marx expands from this to discuss the ar­
rangement of people and the various means of production that result in a machine that is no
longer solely technical, but also a total social assemblage:
"[O]nce adopted into the production process of capital, the means of labour passes
through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an auto­
matic system of machinery (system of machinery: the automatic one is merely its most ad­
equate form, and alone transforms machinery into a system), set in motion by an
automaton, a moving power that moves itself; this automaton consisting of numerous
mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are cast merely as its
conscious linkages. [...] In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker's
means of labour." (692) By including Marx into the discussion we have mobilised three spe­
cific cuts through society that highlight the machine perspective. First there is the auto­
maton, the social individual as subjectified by the system of machinery. Second are the
means of production, which are the mechanical apparatuses used in the production of
goods. Third, is the machinelike social system, which implicates the individual labourers in­
to labouring on the machinery. These cuts through the machine perspective map onto the
problem of technological networks and their automation. First is the user ­ the individual
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the network , third is network as a whole ­ the total assemblage of machines and users that
organises labour into production, and organises leisure time into labour.
Raunig informs us greatly by expanding on the relationship of immaterial labour in
the context of machinic production. In "Machine Fragments" he states "The workers operat­
ing the apparatuses are just as much a part of the machine as the intellectual, cognitive la­
bour of those who have developed the machine and make up its social environment"
(22­23). Here the human has become an automaton, not simply as the meaty apparatus of a
clunky mechanism, but as a real, objectified investment of human knowledge in the ma­
chine itself. The intellectual power of those people who conceptualised, designed, and pro­
duced the machine are invested in the machine in the ossified form of the general intellect.
In this sense, all machines and tools are expressions of the individual intent that designed
and constructed them, and have taken on a life of their own. As Marx states, they are "or­
gans of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified.
[...] to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under
the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it" (706). This
'general intellect' is one of the primary problematics that motivates arguments over the la­
bour theory of value that have emerged recently around the issue of immaterial labour (for
example, the dialogue between Fuchs, and Arvidson and Colleoni).
In their role as the conscious linkages between machines, humans are explicitly de­
scribed as machinelike by Marx, because, in terms of their effects on the machinic systems of
both the means and mode of production, a human being is the moving power which moves
itself, but totally subject to the imposition of the conditions of their labour and to the mode
of production ­ in other words, "an automaton" (692).
THE BASICS OF DDOS ATTACKS
The Distributed Denial of Service or DDoS attack is a methodology for functionally
removing a node from a network. Yuan and Mills define a DDoS attack as "a simultaneous
network attack on a victim (e.g., a Web server or a router) from a large number of com­
promised hosts, which may be distributed widely among different, independent networks.
By exploiting asymmetry between network­wide resources and local capacities of a victim,
a DDoS attack can build up an intended congestion very quickly at an attacked target"
(2005, 324). The end­to­end structure, first argued for by Saltzer, et al., as the most efficient
and effective means of structuring a computerised network, has since become the crux for a
successful DDoS attack. A large number of attackers sending information to a victim com­
puter, with the information framed either as requests for data, or as messages or instruc­
tions to be processed. These messages become a part of a process queue which has the
capacity to deal with a limited amount of tasks. Once the queue is full, the system will not
respond until it has finished processing at least some portion of the information ­ hence
'denial of service'. As long as an attack continues, the victim is unlikely to be able to process
information at a sufficient rate in order to complete the queue, so the target may remain off­
line for as long as the attack continues. Large numbers of requests are necessary to fill pro­
cess queues, and in order to achieve the necessary number of requests, the attack has to be
come from a number of attack vectors ­ hence 'distributed'. With large numbers of attackers,
and a small range of targets, the ratio of attack nodes to victims in an attack will tend to ap­
proximate a many­to­one relationship, which leads to the asymmetry in computing re­
sources that Yuan and Mills refer to. Even if the target computer has a very high processing
speed, it is difficult to deal with the sheer number of requests from the larger DDoS attacks.
Because data packets are not generally acted upon between their source and destination,
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Despite that, DDoS attacks are not fool proof, and are able to be defended against. As
Yuan and Mills point out, it is necessary to first detect the existence of an attack before a de­
fence can be mounted. Because the nature of DDoS attacks involves great volumes of traffic,
congestion occurs across the whole of the network, so to some extent the best defences occur
upstream of the victim node. This is not always possible, as it requires coordination
between the victim and their service provider, so it is necessary to have local measures that
can deployed once a DDoS attack has begun. While a common enough response is for a vic­
tim to switch their operations to another more secure server, this is not always possible,
particularly for small operations. In almost every other case, the defence protocols involve
suspending or refusing connections with other nodes on the network, either by ignoring
particular compromised servers, or certain ranges of IP addresses. By electing to refuse cer­
tain IP address ranges, this effectively still results in the server being removed from the net­
work ­ a type of voluntary, rather than enforced exit. Modifying network settings to ignore
particular IP ranges will still result in non­attacking IP addresses from being excluded. Even
then, any attack program other than the most basic DDoS implementations will generally
provide IP spoofing and other techniques for subverting defence mechanisms. Security
firms and academic researchers are regularly involved in producing new techniques for de­
fending against DDoS attacks. These are, at least somewhat, a proprietary service. At this
stage, the DDoS attack remains a somewhat effective means of mobilisng a large number of
computers towards various types of political dissent, although the outcomes of the specific
DDoS attacks themselves still leave a lot to be desired in terms of political relevance.
The DDoS attack has many differing effects on the victim ­ for instance, increasing
the costs in telecommunications charges, removing an institution's ability to communicate
over networks, shutting out clients for businesses, disrupting financial transactions, loss of
trades for commercial organisations, and so on. In political terms, it can show the vulnerab­
ility of corporations and nation states to the power of various collective practices. At times it
can lead to the automated reset of servers, which opens the server to various security vul­
nerabilities for breaches by 'genuine' hackers. At the same time, corporations and nation
states are more than capable of deploying large resources to disrupt the communications of
individuals or political groups. Garnaeva and Namestnikov have an extensive analysis of
DDoS attacks in 2011, and note that servers for the Israeli Defence Force, the Mossad, the
Oakland police department, Mastercard, and Hong Kong Stock Exchange were high­profile
targets of denial of service attacks.
In the context of a network operating on computerised network protocols, the DDoS
attack methodology bases itself on the principle that a large number of attackers can con­
sume the information processing resources at a target IP address. Because these targets are
either individual servers or server clusters, whose function is dedicated to dealing with in­
coming requests, the attack needs to be coordinated to some extent. The DDoS attack is
unique among network attack methodologies because, rather than requiring a vast amount
of technical competency with the minutae of computer network protocols, operating system
vulnerabilities, or other activities described as hacking or cracking, the DDoS attack works
through simple brute force. This means that, at times, it is the result of actual democratic us­
age of the structure of the network in a manner that attacks the structure itself. From a
Marxist perspective, that is a periodic and temporary mechanism for causing the machine of
network capitalism to operate in its own terms against itself. A highly specific and short­
lived self­destruction from which the system will eventually recover.
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a form of post­political democratic protest ­ however it is precisely this appearance that this
article seeks to undermine. The fact that the machines are used to engage in dissent in a rep­
resentational form means that the DDoS attack methodology tends towards a non­demo­
cratic form ­ one could even say republican form, in the sense that certain well­connected
individuals possess a disproportionate percentage of representative power. The reason that
the system is not inherently democratic is because one user may mobilise multiple com­
puters in the DDoS attack, and may automate this procedure over the network.
When the DDoS attack methodology is democratic is in its ability to allow self­rep­
resentative dissent to occur over a network. That is, when one individual activates one com­
puter as part of a political protest based on an effusion of presence. This has led various
communities of dissent to refer to such acts as forms of 'digital sit­ins', a move that resur­
rects the political rhetorics of the civil rights movement. Such an analogy is duplicitous, as
the purposes are different ­ the lunch counter sit­ins during the civil rights movement were
geared towards allowing persons of non­European descent to be treated as equal con­
sumers, with equal access to the space of the cafeteria. For 'digital sit­ins' the spaces are
already fully accessible by all, and it is only with the disruption of the DDoS attack itself
that access begins to be disrupted. Furthermore, the analogy has similarities to the idea of
'cyberspace' ­ an idea with little theoretical purchase. The target of the DDoS attack is a ma­
chine, not a space, and as such, the sit­in should be reconsidered as sabotage.
Here the DDoS attack acts as a new take on the old processes of sabotage. Rather
than throwing one's shoes into the machinery, the political DDoS attack takes the form of an
aggressive amount of attention to shut down the means of communication and subjectifica­
tion. In the space of network communications in postindustrial capitalism, for sites that are
totally dependent on the mechanisms of networks for their existence, this can be a substan­
tial threat to continued operations. Sites such as eBay and Amazon, or transaction sites like
PayPal and Mastercard could face serious financial consequences if their businesses were
disrupted for even a short amount of time.
There are two ways to organise a DDoS attack ­ the first is social, the second is tech­
nical. In the social case, the sole requirement is that enough individuals are induced into
making data requests simultaneously. This is something that can happen accidentally. For
instance, the computer tech website Slashdot is a news­based link forum that holds many
millions of members. When a link is posted to Slashdot by an editor, many hundreds of
thousands of individuals often try to visit the site. When the hosting server is assigned only
a moderate amount of data capacity, or data bandwidth, such as a hobby site, a small uni­
versity or business, or similar, then the website can be shunted off the internet fairly
quickly. This is called being "slashdotted". Various other large sites have equivalent names,
but the mechanism is usually the same. The result is an unintentional DDoS attack. Because
this is not a deliberate attack, the site will usually only be offline for a matter of hours. In
comparison to deliberate technological DDoS attacks, Garnaeva and Namestnikov point to
the longest intentional attack of late­2011 within their data as lasting over 80 days. In terms
of organisational techniques, the social method of engaging in a DDoS attack by Anonym­
ous is mobilised through short lived operational briefings, called "ops".
The technical method for engaging in a DDoS attack usually involves two things: a
command and control, or C+C, server, and a set of compromised machines. Compromised
machines are computers connected to the network that have been infected with some form
of malware. By virtue of this malware, an external source can give instructions to the com­
puter, most likely outside the knowledge of the computer's owner or users. C+C servers op­
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structions. Individual compromised machines are referred to as 'bots' and the network that
is controlled by the C+C server is referred to as a 'botnet'. While a botnet can be deployed
for any number of computational tasks ­ password cracking, spamming, deploying further
viruses, and so on ­ our interest is in its role in DDoS attacks. It is also worth noting that
botnets do not strictly require a C+C server for functionality, and control of the botnet can
be achieved by means such as P2P network protocols; however, for our purposes this is
functionally equivalent to the centralised form of control offered by a C+C server. The bot­
net receives instructions for attack vectors from the C+C server, and operates to attack their
chosen targets. The processing power of a botnet can be massive: in 2010 Weaver estimated
that the Conficker­C botnet, named after its infection malware, had over ten million com­
promised machines involved in its network. The potential power of such a network is suffi­
cient to overpower many target computers several times over, which leads to the interesting
case where botnets can, at times, be rented from their owners for the purposes of brute force
password cracking, DDoS attacks, and other similar tasks.
For a sustained political use of the DDoS attack, it is necessary to find a mix of auto­
mated code and social engagement. Software is required to sustain a DDoS attack for longer
than a few hours, so that the data requests that render an IP address unusuable remain con­
sistent over time. The element of social engagement means that the quantity of invested in­
dividuals is increased to the point where the number of requests is sufficient to have an
impact at the target computer.
One of the main parties that utilises DDoS attacks politically is the loose collection of
individuals known as 'Anonymous'. Anonymous is a group that does its best to completely
avoid any form of identity politics, and members usually make reference to themselves as
'anons' or in the third person as 'Anonymous'. Part of their slogan explicitly defines them­
selves as such: "We are Anonymous. We are Legion." Anonymous is mainly known as a de­
centralised online activist community with a strong free speech stance and a dislike of
intellectual property laws, and a secondary position of anti­identity politics. While there are
tensions between their dislike of "hate speech" and their advocacy of free speech, their gen­
eral political position is roughly a form of anarchistic liberalism. Politically, Anonymous
lacks a central tenet or principles for political activism, although there are many ad hoc so­
cial practices that fade in and out of relevancy. Although its inception was as an anti­Sci­
entology collective, this later expanded to include attacks on the Westboro Baptist Church,
before contributing to the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011. Along the way, they have
targeted organisations such as PayPal and Amazon, cyber­bullies and child pornography
rings. Organised solely over networked communications, Anonymous generally engages in
three forms of political activism: online and offline demonstrations, defacement or intrusion
server hacks, and a presence in news media and social networking. Anonymous' members
are diffuse, in the sense that individuals can join and leave at any time, and the success of
any individual political action is roughly proportional to the number of members who sub­
scribe to the political principles of the action. The individual political goals of members
vary, and if the rhetoric that is deployed amongst their users is to be believed, they include
all ranges of political position, including anarchistic, radically neoliberal, and communistic
perspectives.
Anonymous' collectivity claims to be so broad as to include any and all individuals
that are willing to become a part of it, or so they claim. The extent to which they attempt to
achieve this is found in the "#OpNewBlood" project. This "operation" is a document that
contains all the seed information for any individual with an internet connection to begin to
communicate within the channels utilised by the Anonymous group. They have several
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to aid newcomers to their group. For instance, the "#OpNewblood Super Secret Security
Handbook" details a number of techniques and basic information about HTML­based
browsing security, Virtual Private Networks, and the use of virtual machines. The docu­
ment "OpNewblood Guide for IRC Chat Setup & Anonymous Internet Browsing" provides
basic information about joining Internet Relay Chat, or IRC, discussion groups. Tellingly,
with regards to their open and free relationship to membership, their document ends with a
reversal of their slogan: "Welcome. You are now Anonymous, but you were already. We are
legion. Do not forgive. Do not forget. We were expecting you."
While there is a fair amount of internal political activity going on, in the sense of ex­
tensive IRC discussions on all manner of concerns, the main connection between Anonym­
ous and the outside world is in terms of their disruption of computer networks. While often
described as a 'hacktivist' group, the term is problematic and many of its members lack a
great deal of prowess when it comes to actually engaging in sophisticated intrusion tech­
niques. To this end, the group utilises a software application known as the Low Orbit Ion
Cannon, or LOIC, to aid its less technologically advanced users in their protests. The applic­
ation has a number of versions, usually recognisable due to their similarity in naming con­
ventions: HOIC, JSLOIC, GOIC, LOIC2, and so on. The variations between each version are
less important for this article, as the interface remains roughly the same between variations.
When deployed by a user, the LOIC requires simply that a few details be inputted with re­
gards to target IP addresses, frequency of attack, and a status window that declares the rel­
ative level of 'success' of the attack. While attacking, the application either sends simple
messages or makes requests for data from the server. Each individual user contributes only
a small amount to the greater portion of the DDoS attack, and a large number of individuals
are required to contribute before the attack reaches the point where it effectively achieves
anything. It is only when the number requests exceeds the rate at which the server can cope
with the requests that the server is effectively pushed off the internet.
A technical analysis by Mansfield­Devine examines the nature of the LOIC applica­
tion and its derivatives. Mansfield­Devine notes that most variants of the application lack
any form of user protections, in the form of IP spoofing or other methods for hiding data
about the LOIC's users. Pras (8) also notes that the instruction guide to the LOIC application
distributed by Anonymous includes specific claims that the users of the tool will have a de­
gree of protection that simply is not present. In fact, Pras et al note that one of the few pro­
tections that the users of the LOIC might have is the limits of legal jurisdiction to prosecute
internationally.
To some extent, Anonymous' DDoS attacks are centrally orchestrated ­ some versions
of the LOIC allow users to simply follow the 'hivemind' and follow attack instructions from
specialised IRC threads. For the most part, individual involvement is spurious, and many
attack attempts do not have sufficient levels of members involved to sustain successful at­
tacks. Despite this, Anonymous continues to utilise DDoS attacks in political protests, and
will likely continue to for the foreseeable future.
THE AUTOMATON
The purpose of using the idea of the automaton as an interrogative device is twofold.
It conjures both the idea of a metastable machinic subjectivity that is distinct from ­ almost
opposite to ­ the idea of the cyborg that dominates science fiction metaphors of post­indus­
trial capitalism, and, also, as a product of this particular form of subjectivity, it fixes a par­
ticular relationship between the worker and the mode of production. Broadly, an
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autonomy from any external control. At times this is the result of a sophisticated series of
mechanisms ­ digital codes, hydraulic devices, moving weights, or clockwork gears ­ at oth­
er times it is the result of subterfuge. Numerous automata have existed where the device is
not controlled by an internal series of mechanisms, but rather are powered by an individual
hidden inside the machine; indeed all automata require an external motivator because no
mechanism within the universe, whether mechanical, biological, or physical, is a totally self­
contained system. Rather than state that these are somehow invalid or illegitimate auto­
mata, I would instead suggest that this is a central element to the concept of the automaton ­
the simulation of a machine subjectivity whose exact nature we cannot necessarily interrog­
ate. In a computerised format, I would point to assemblages such as the artificial intelli­
gence Cleverbot, as comparative examples of this phenomenon. Cleverbot is a chatterbot
program that is designed to mimic human conversation; however, its database of conversa­
tions is not programmed into it. Instead, when a user interacts with it, it responds on the
basis of the conversation habits of individuals it has communicated with previously. There
is a machine in play, but it is only mobilised by the actions and behaviours of those that
have come before, and any semblance of a subject emerging from the machine is only a
product of these structures.
The etymology of automaton itself stretches back to antiquity, with its etymon emer­
ging in ancient Greece. An automaton was a type of marionette, for the theatre or entertain­
ment. In this role, the marionette was one whose operator was hidden or obscured from the
view of the audience. In terms of its components, 'auto­' refers to the self, while '­maton' is
cognate with 'mind'. The automaton is a type of synthetic entity that appears to act and
move unbidden by external forces. The key, here, is 'appears': the source or cause of the
automaton's movements is not immediately clear to the observer. Where the marionette was
controlled by a puppeteer's strings, automatons were eventually developed to became in­
ternally controlled, whether by a series of complex clockwork gears powered by wound
springs, or hydraulic systems that produced responses on the basis of ratios of water pres­
sure.
The first independently mechanical devices to be called automatons were the devices
of the first century inventor, Hero of Alexandria. These were simply, as Stafford and Terpak
describe them, "early examples of complex machines" which held no resemblance to a hu­
man (266). But to those unfamiliar with the ideas of early science, they implied an unseen
operator controlling the individual elements of machines. The idea of the automaton re­
ceived new life in the 17th century, with the emergence of simple mechanisms added to the
magnificent clocks of European cathedrals. Tom Standage writes, in The Mechanical Turk,
that "these clocks often had astronomical features (such as the phase of the moon) and in
some cases entire mechanical theatres that sprang to life on particular occasions" (3). Over
time, these accoutrements became an attraction in their own right, and clock­making tech­
niques were modified to produce wind­up mechanisms that operated on the basis of elastic
energy potentials contained in spring systems inside the toy. These new developments be­
came the basis for a thriving economy of jewel­encrusted devices that Britain exported in
great quantities. When the eventual glut in the market arrived in the latter portion of the
eighteenth century, museums opened in London to display all manner of automated "ele­
phants, griffins, and obelisks" cast with opals, ivory and gold, along with other articles in a
cabinet of curiosities that was open to the public (Stafford and Terpak, 269).
In the more modern appearances, an automaton is no longer simply any machine,
but is instead a mechanical being that often simulates life. At times this simulation is a
simple act of aesthetic representation; for instance, the 15th Century statue, known as the
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ing its head, smiling, and giving the appearance of crying ­ but nothing more. In other cases
automata involved a more sophisticated arrangement of mechanics or computer code to de­
velop a behavioural semblance of a living being, or perform more pragmatic tasks. This in­
cludes a handwriting machine programmed by spindles, developed by Friedrich von
Knauss, who is credited with being the inventor of the typewriter. Automata have increas­
ingly, over history of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, increased in
their diversity of form. Records exist of mechanical eagles and lions, a brass fly, a jewel en­
crusted elephant, dancing ballerinas, harp­players, winged angels and more (Standage 3­5).
While being a consciously man­made mechanical device, whatever limited functional
purposes the automaton is set to, some effort is made in its production to morphologically
resemble a biological being. At times this meant that some automata were designed or built
with rudimentary organs. Standage refers to Jacques de Vaucanson as designing three auto­
mata that had some semblance of internal organs: an automaton of a young boy that had
functioning bellows that would allow it to play a flute, a second flute­player that also
played a drum, and finally, a feathered metal duck that could eat grain and digest it in a
rubber alimentary system (8­9).
Some models of automata took this idea of the emulation of a conscious being some­
what further. The famous Mechanical Turk that Standage has named his book after, is an
interesting case in point. The Mechanical Turk was an automaton that was designed to play
chess against a human opponent. Built in 1770 by Wolfgang von Kempelen, the machine
featured a turbaned mannequin seated above a large wooden box filled with gears and
cabling. By way of a mechanical hand, the 'Turk' would move pieces across the chessboard.
The idea of a robot made from simple springs and cogs being as successful at chess is per­
haps too fantastic to believe, especially when, for decades, supercomputers, such as Deep
Blue, were required to play successfully against the top ranked human players. Indeed, the
idea is too fantastic ­ the machine was designed such that it could accommodate a human
player within the contraption, and gave them access to a control for the mechanical arm.
Von Kempelen's deceit was not unusual amongst automata ­ Standage notes at least one
other instance where a harp­playing automaton was found to contain a 5­year old child.
The Turk has since re­emerged as an un­ironic metaphor for the outsourcing of la­
bour from machines to humans in Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk marketplace. Those us­
ing the Mechanical Turk marketplace are directly renting the computation power of human
beings by passing large amounts of problems from a dataset into the Turk. Ten percent of
the wage paid by the purchaser is passed on to Amazon, with the remaining portion going
to the labourer. In this case the automaton houses not one, but thousands of human sub­
jects. The purpose for this process is not simply to an imposed alienation of the labourer
from the capitalist: certain organisational or mathematical problems are particularly diffi­
cult for a computer to resolve, and are best resolved by human operators ­ such as identify­
ing images or the transcription of audio recordings. This has led to many interesting uses of
the Mechanical Turk marketplace, although one in particular acts as a modern curiosity:
Matt Richardson's 'Descriptive Camera' art project. The mechanics of the descriptive camera
include a webcam, a thermal printer, and a network connection to Amazon's Mechanical
Turk, combined into one apparatus. The project involves the camera sending photographs
to the Turk with an instruction for human operators to textually describe the scene, and the
description is sent back to the camera, which then prints the statement on the thermal print­
er.
A primary concern of early observers of these automata was the 'truth' of the mech­
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simulacra of a living being. This concern is one that has become unnecessary or uninformat­
ive in the context of network communications. Alan Turing famously proposed an imitation
game wherein an artificial intelligence emulates human qualities in order to convince a hu­
man player that they are talking with a flesh­and­blood being (1950, 433­436). Turing's
game has spawned a variety of attempts to produce machinic subjectivities that have re­
markably high 'pass rates' of convincing players that they are talking to a human being. In­
deed, the authors of Cleverbot claim to have achieved a 59.3% 'humanity score' in a test
against human players, where the human players only achieved a score of 63.3%. Notably,
the judging committee has decreed score of over 50% is distinguished as 'human'. This does
not mean that it is worthless to attempt to discern whether a subjectivity on the internet is
human or otherwise, simply that the process of interrogation is rarely necessary for regular
interaction, or for academic social theory. Artificial intelligences themselves are, after all,
programmed by an author, and to this end are simply another layer of machinery between
an author and an audience. Along this line, we can see the cohesion between the idea of the
human being and the automaton, and can expand on this via a short examination of
Descartes.
As early as 1630, Descartes argued that animals and other biological phenomena
were nothing more than complex automata. According to Descartes, these bÃªte machines ­
'beast machines' ­ were the product of God's mechanistic capabilities that would go un­
matched by human beings (Cottingham, 551). This was not to deny that animals felt noth­
ing, or that their pain was somehow illegitimate, but rather that they lacked what would be
defined in contemporary contexts as a subjectivity or psyche. The nature of an automaton
was nothing less than an understanding of all biological beings in the light of a Cartesean
mechanistic understanding of the universe. Descartes' use of the term 'automaton' operates
to define much of the modern understanding of automatons as synthetic and mechanical
but also capable of generating affects in observers through their representations of alterity.
Descartes believed that, although these automata were beyond the capacity of humans to
create at the time did not mean that they were any less an automaton than one made of
mechanical parts. What distinguished the human being from all other biological automaton
was the presence of a divinely created soul, tied to the body through the pineal gland, and
acts as the basis for a form of theological humanism. Descartes would later expand on this
when he states:
"The key point to grasp, to my mind, is that no motions can take place, whether in
animals' bodies or ours, unless these bodies contain absolutely all the organs or instruments
by means of which the same motions could also be produced in a machine. So true is this,
that not even in ourselves does the mind move the external limbs directly: it only directs the
animal spirits that flow from the heart through the brain into the muscles, and determines
them to specific movements, since of themselves the spirits are applied with equal facility to
many different actions." (Descartes, 2008, 147) This is one perspective into Descartes' mind­
body dualism, where subjectivity and psyche originate outside of the body, leaving the ma­
chinic automaton of the meaty body to act according to the whims of the spirit. Spirit, ac­
cording to Descartes, is a quality that can only be held by human beings, whereas animals
are left to an uncritical stimulus response with their environment. The presumption that hu­
mans and animals were both mechanical beings, but were somehow fundamentally differ­
ent by virtue of a psyche exterior to the body, is something that the philosopher Eugene
Thacker refers to as the "notorious analogy" (2010, 25). This, for Thacker, is emblematic of
the notion of "superlative life" ­ where the category that defines what life is, is somehow ex­
ternal to the bodies in which life is expressed. This causes a split Superlative life seeks to be
life as "generosity, as proliferation, as excess" and points to ideas of spirits and souls that are
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system of the social world, and is difficult to utilise effectively in discussions regarding
communication and subjectivity. Descartes' idea of the automaton pushes the individual
subjects beyond the more material social concerns of networked political communication
that I wish to examine.
Descartes' work has rhetorical and conceptual similarities to the position I am seek­
ing to discuss, insofar as the subject's existence in the world is machine­like, but Descartes
moves to transcend the subject/psyche to a position superior to the body in a manner that is
difficult to utilise. Following Hayles' writing in the context of cyborgean humans, we
should "turn Descartes upside down", and note that "conscious thought becomes an epi­
phenomenon corresponding to the phenomenal base the body provides" (1999, 203). Per­
haps Deleuze and Guattari can enlighten us, with their quote from Lewis Mumford: "If a
machine can be defined more or less in accord with the classic definition of Reuleaux, as a
combination of resistant parts, each specialised in function, operating under human control
to transmit motion and to perform work, then the human machine was a real machine"
(1987, 504­505). My approach, unlike Descartes, wishes to be totally immanent to the world
of networks, and in order to do this, we will turn to the works of Karl Marx.
Marx shows the automaton as a framing device for political subjectivities in networks
in the pages of the Grundrisse, where humans have been reduced to the meaty parts of ma­
chine networks. There is an alternative, but compatible, position in the works of Deleuze
and Guattari ­ particularly developed in Guattari's works in the early 1980s ­ and a contem­
porary framing in the work of Gerald Raunig, that deals with the expansion of these net­
work ideas from a purely mechanical network, into a social use of the idea of the
automaton. These four thinkers develop the idea of the automaton, not as a larvatus prodeo
subjectivity of the ghost in the machine, but instead as a totally immanent machine within
the machine.
Before continuing onto the discussion of networks, it is worth discussing the limita­
tions of the idea of the automaton. To use the automaton as a figure of the post­industrial
subject of capital in this manner is to reduce the individual conditions of work to the lowest
common denominator, and ­ in the context of an immanent approach ­ limits the notion of
agency by almost removing it entirely. Doing this rides roughshod over the differences in
the conditions of labour within post­industrial capital ­ that is, the concept of the automaton
can conveniently apply itself to industrial and agricultural labour, and primarily ignores af­
fective forms of labour, it does so at the cost of analytical scrutiny of these important issues.
These drawbacks are opposed to the strength that is finding a means of discussing la­
bouring subjects within social machines in terms of a common grounding that allows us to
examine collectivities without subsuming individuation any further. This means that the is­
sue of identity politics is removed from the equation. Identity politics is a difficult beast to
deal with in online spaces, in the sense that the technologies of communication obliterate
physiological distinctions between individuals. Once these distinctions begin to disappear,
there is no strong categorical system for defining individuals communicating over a net­
work. 'Disappear' is used advisedly here: the disappearance does not equate to an end to
the politics of identity, but rather a terrain that poses problems of visibility for identity. This
is the issue that Turing's imitation game brings to the fore ­ we are always less than one
hundred percent certain of who we are communicating with over the internet. Once cat­
egories based around identity have been disappeared, various forms of patterns can be seen
to emerge that are temporary and shifting that are otherwise interpreted as elements occur­
ring within a particular form of politics, when, instead, they are open and unconstrained by
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RECONCILITATION
So then, to what end does an informal, open, and vulnerable group like Anonym­
ous,and the crude means by which it engages in DDoS attacks have any use for an analysis
through the automata? In order to understand this, it is first necessary to understand that
the open and collaborative organisation of the political actions that Anonymous takes part
in appears to be a ruse, and that probably many members are unaware of this fact. As
Mansfield­Devine notes, the ability for members of Anonymous to communicate effectively
within such an anarchic structure is all well and good, but majority of the most successful
attacks seem to be organised outside of the input of the community itself. When an attack
bulletin is released, many members will simply accede to the instructions. Because these
bulletins are often released or redistributed 'in the wild', the only quality that officiates them
is a particular aesthetic approach ­ this has led to the Westboro Baptist Church covertly re­
leasing attack documents in the same style as Anonymous' regular releases, ostensibly in
order to obtain attackers' IP addresses for purposes of litigation (see "Message to the West­
boro Baptist Church, the Media, and Anonymous as a Whole."). In the gap between the dis­
cussions that occur within the Anonymous communication channels, and the actual attack
instructions, there is a space for manipulation, and Mansfield­Devine suggests that this is a
space that is employed by the organisational core to Anonymous, which effectively manip­
ulates the community's desire for action into specific tasks. Some of these individuals have
already been arrested since Mansfield­Devine's publication. Eighteen year old Jake 'Topiary'
Davis was famously arrested at his home on the extremely isolated Shetland Islands for
running multiple Twitter accounts for a group closely associated with Anonymous, while
Hector 'Sabu' Monsegur turned as a informant for the group after being arrested for hacking
by the FBI. Sixteen people were arrested mid­2011 for their alleged involvement with An­
onymous and ­ contrary to popular expectations that they would be all teenagers, their me­
dian age was 24 (Winter, 2011). Mansfield­Devine's assessment of a central organisational
core to Anonymous suggests that the majority of the members are simply part of an ablative
attack vector for a central command that designates the actions of the group.
To this extent, if we speak with an analysis that addresses the functionality of the so­
cial machine of Anonymous, rather than as a conspiracy, then Anonymous operates to draw
in large numbers of politically committed individuals who have little capacity to identify
other individuals within the group. Furthermore, they will operate in terms of the instruc­
tions given out through the organisational documents, simply pointing their LOIC applica­
tions at the appointed target, and clicking the proper button. When the political dissent is so
systematised, controlling a large number of compromised computers in a botnet is not alto­
gether different from organising a large number of individuals to accomplish the same task.
The functional difference between a C+C server that mobilises a compromised computer to
make spurious data requests of a target, and an online manifesto that mobilises an indi­
vidual to do the same, is very small when it comes to the victim.
Given that, under these conditions, the individual members of Anonymous are
largely unimportant and undifferentiated, they have no strict identity of their own beyond
the few traces that they leave on the network, their political influence on the network is
largely a product of already­defined manifesto materials, and their subject presence outside
of the network is not connected to the mechanisms of their online presence, then they are an
excellent example of the automation of political dissent.
A DDoS attack by Anonymous is not the only political action that can be addressed
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democratic or capillary instances of dissent. As Goncharov reports, in Russia in late 2011,
anti­Putin political protests were being organised over Twitter under a particular set of
hashtags. These hashtags, and others like them, were soon rendered unusable as pro­gov­
ernment activists mobilised bot accounts to post to these hashtags at a rate of up to 10 posts
per second. Twitter quickly became unusable for political organisation of democratic
protest. Here the machine of political oppression exploited the mechanisms of dissent to its
own ends.
The extent to which a paradigm of automated dissent ceases to be useful is exactly
the same point where political dissent stops being mobilised over technological machines.
For the remaining cases of digital activism, the paradigm is informative when it comes to
analysing the production of particular forms of subjectivity in the context of network polit­
ics that attempt to exist outside of other forms of politics.
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